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Who is in Charge? State Power and
Agency in Sino-African Relations
Pádraig Carmody & Peter Kragelund†
Recently, much has been written about the role of African agency in
the continent’s emergent relationship with China. Some scholars have
argued that previous writing on the subject of Sino-African relations
presented an unbalanced picture in which an all-powerful China subjugated weak African states, thereby replicating previous Orientalist tropes
about Africa. More recent scholarship by Corkin, Mohan, and others, however, has focused on the significant power of African political elites in shaping the nature of relations with China. This Article seeks to conceptualize
the nature of the power relations between China and African states by
examining concepts deployed in these scholarly debates. We then test
these concepts through case studies of Angola and Zambia— two of the
African states with which China has been most engaged and two major
commodity exporter monoeconomies.
I. Is China an Emergent Hegemon in Africa? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. From Hegemony to Hegemony? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Defining Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. The Assemblage Line of Sino-African Relations . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Power Shifts in Zambia and Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Sino-Zambian Relations: “Agency at the Margins”? . . . . .
B. Sino-Angolan Relations: An Example of “Hemmed In”
Agency? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. Conclusion: Who is in Charge? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Is China an Emergent Hegemon in Africa?

A 2007 paper by Pádraig Carmody and Francis Owusu argued that
China was a potential emerging hegemon in Africa, and that it was in competition with the United States to become the most powerful “external”
power on the continent.1 The competition between China and the United
† Pádraig Carmody: Department of Geography, Trinity College Dublin and
Department of Geography, Environmental Management and Energy Studies, University
of Johannesburg. Peter Kragelund: Department of Social Sciences and Business,
Roskilde University. Many thanks to Robert Rotberg, Ian Taylor, Hannah Freedman, and
Chelsea Gunter for their comments, and Alexandra Gordon for her editorial guidance
and assistance. The usual disclaimers apply. This paper was prepared for the Cornell
International Law Journal symposium.
1. See Pádraig R. Carmody & Francis Y. Owusu, Competing Hegemons? Chinese Versus American Geo-Economic Strategies in Africa, 26 POL. GEOGRAPHY 504, 506, 508– 12
(2007) (discussing China’s strategic involvement in Africa).
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States in Africa has amplified in recent years, as evidenced by the first U.S.Africa summit, held in 2014 in Washington, D.C.2 This conference was
arguably inspired by The Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a
meeting that occurs every three years and alternates between China and
Africa in terms of its location.3
Recently, however, there have also been some dramatic changes in U.S.
relations with oil exporters in Africa— although the commodity previously
dominated the bulk of U.S. trade and imports from the continent, this is no
longer the case because of the “shale revolution” in the United States.4
When President Barack Obama visited Africa in 2013, he said that
“[f]rankly, we don’t need energy from Africa,”5 and this comment now
seems to be being borne out. For example, the United States did not
import any oil from Nigeria in October of 2014, despite the fact that Nigeria was the United States’ fifth largest supplier only a few years earlier.6
Additionally, it has been argued elsewhere that the rise of China in
Africa undermines the very notion of “the West” and that this is one of the
reasons that China’s rejuvenated interest in Africa has elicited such hysteria in the Western media.7 Aside from the macroeconomic statistics
around rates of economic growth, balance of trade, or foreign exchange
reserves,8 in concrete geographic terms China-Africa relations are arguably
the canary in the mine of Western power. The question, then, is whether
China will become a hegemon on the continent, or whether we are seeing a
rise in African agency pointing towards multipolar power structures and
orientations on the continent. In order to answer this question, it is first
necessary to engage with and define the concept of hegemony.
A.

From Hegemony to Hegemony?

There are at least two definitions of what constitutes hegemony. From
a Gramscian perspective, “hegemony” refers to the acquiescence or consent
of subordinate classes or countries to the dominance of the ruling class or
power.9 On the other hand, realists view international hegemons as those
2. See U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/us-africa-leaders-summit.
3. See generally IAN TAYLOR, THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (FOCAC)
(2011) (providing an overview of FOCAC).
4. See Clifford Krauss, A New ‘OPEC’ Emerges: The U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2015,
at F1; Javier Blas, Victim of Shale Revolution, Nigeria Stops Exporting Oil to US, FIN.
TIMES: BLOGS (Oct. 2, 2014, 10:12 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/10/02/
victim-of-shale-revolution-nigeria-stops-exporting-oil-to-us/.
5. Ed Stoddard, AFRICA INVESTMENT— Can Obama’s Africa Power Plan Hold a
Candle to China?, REUTERS (July 2, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/02/
africa-investment-idUSL5N0F821520130702.
6. See Blas, supra note 4.
7. PÁDRAIG R. CARMODY, THE RISE OF THE BRICS IN AFRICA: THE GEOPOLITICS OF
SOUTH-SOUTH RELATIONS 137 (2013).
8. See, e.g., Makhtar Diop, World Bank Vice President for the Africa Region, Lessons for Africa from China’s Growth (Jan. 13, 2015) (transcript available at http://www
.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2015/01/13/lessons-for-africa-from-chinas-growth).
9. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILL, GRAMSCI, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: AN ESSAY IN METHOD 21– 26 (1993); ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE
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states that are able to set the rules of the game in international politics.10
Thus, according to realists, the American state is no longer a hegemon
because it has lost the ability to shape international rules and regimes to
the degree that it once could, despite the fact that it is still the preeminent
state in the international system.11 Meanwhile, China is busy concluding
deals and establishing new institutions on a bilateral or limited multilateral
basis.12 For example, the new Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa (BRICS) development bank will be headquartered in China,13 and
China has also recently announced the establishment of a joint bank with
Malaysia that will circumvent the necessity to conduct trade between the
two countries in U.S. dollars.14 China has also agreed to currency swaps
with many countries around the world ranging from Switzerland and Russia to Argentina,15 while in Zambia, the Bank of China uses large-scale billboards strategically positioned in and around Lusaka to advertise its new
service, a facility to conduct business in the Chinese yuan.16
As the world emerges from the global financial crisis, future historians
and international relations theorists will perhaps treat this period as a time
of hegemonic transition from the United States to China in the international system, even as rates of economic growth moderate in China. On the
one hand, for the first time in over 140 years, in 2013 the United States lost
its position as the world’s largest economy to China, when measured by
purchasing power parity.17 On the other hand, however, others argue that
we are witnessing the emergence of “interdependent hegemony,” rather
than the emergence of a new singular dominant power or power bloc in the
PRISON NOTEBOOKS 244 (1971) (describing the state as “the entire complex of practical
and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its
dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules”).
10. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORIES: DISCIPLINE AND DIVERSITY 71, 72 (Tim Dunne et al. eds., 2013) (describing
realists as believing that “power is the currency of international politics” and the realist
belief that “[i]t is important not only to have a substantial amount of power, but also to
make sure that no other state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favor”).
11. Robert H. Wade, Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in
the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF, 39 POL. & SOC’Y 347, 350– 53 (2011) (describing
the shift from an American-dominated international system to the current “multipolar
governance dilemma”).
12. See Pádraig Carmody & Ian Taylor, Flexigemony and Force in China’s Resource
Diplomacy in Africa: Sudan and Gambia Compared, 15 GEOPOLITICS 496, 510 (2010).
13. Gabriel Wildau, New Brics bank in Shanghai to challenge major institutions, FIN.
TIMES (July 21, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d8e26216-2f8d-11e5-8873775ba7c2ea3d.html#axzz3xcRfoSYP.
14. Clare Hammond, World’s Largest Bank ICBC Opens Its Yangon Branch Office,
MYANMAR TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/16388world-s-largest-bank-icbc-opens-its-yangon-branch-office.html.
15. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE SPREAD OF CENTRAL BANK CURRENCY
SWAPS SINCE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2015), http://www.cfr.org/international-finance/central-bank-currency-swaps-since-financial-crisis/p36419#!/?cid=from_interactives_listing.
16. See Louise Redvers, The Rise and Rise of China in Zambia, MAIL & GUARDIAN
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://mg.co.za/article/2011-09-09-the-rise-and-of-china-in-zambia/.
17. Mike Bird, China Just Overtook the U.S. as the World’s Largest Economy, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/china-overtakes-us-as-worldslargest-economy-2014-10.
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form of China or the BRICS grouping.18
China is steadily taking over Europe’s role as Africa’s leading trading
partner and is a substantial source of new investment, although it was only
in one recent year, 2008, that it was the biggest single foreign investor on
the continent.19 The way in which China deploys its power in Africa, however, is different from that of previous hegemons: Chinese actors tailor
their strategies to the histories and geographies of the particular countries
they are engaging with in order to ensure resource, market, and investment
access.20 This form of “flexipower,” or “flexigemony,” which works with
rather than against the grain of African state-society formations, differs
from traditional hegemony.21
Perhaps because of these changes, there has recently been an upsurge
of interest in the role of African agency in shaping the relationship with
China.22 This body of literature may in part be an implicit reaction to an
over-emphasis on the power of China in much of the extant literature,
which was natural given the dramatically increased scale of China’s
engagement on the continent. The newer literature, unlike prior scholarship, argues that African elites have used their growing economic and political interests to exert power over international and domestic politics.23
Additionally, as most African economies grew rapidly as a result of the
global commodity super cycle, African political elites saw tax revenues rise,
aid dependence decrease, and a greater range of potential partners emerge
from the global East. This conjuncture gave African political elites substantial leverage, as has China’s dependence on African oil and other strategic
natural resources to power its economy.24 China’s dependence on African
oil and other critical mineral suppliers, an inversion from prior relationships, has created conditions of interdependence between Chinese and
African political elites that are subject to bargaining.25
18. See generally Xing Li, Conceptualizing the Nexus of “Interdependent Hegemony”
Between the Existing and the Emerging World Orders, 7 FUDAN J. HUM. SOC. SCI. 343
(2014) (describing the concept of interdependent hegemony as the growth of interdependent nexuses between historical and emerging powers that create mutual challenge,
mutual constraint, and mutual accommodation).
19. U.N. Secretariat of U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, 2014, I, III, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/2014 (Sept. 10, 2014).
20. See Carmody & Taylor, supra note 12, at 497.
21. See id. (arguing that “‘flexigemony,’ whereby Chinese actors adapt their strategies to suit the particular histories and geographies of the African states with which they
engage . . . is in contradistinction to the less flexible hegemonic vision of the United
States of ‘free-market democracies’”).
22. See, e.g., Giles Mohan & Ben Lampert, Negotiating China: Reinserting African
Agency into China-African Relations, 112 AFRICAN AFF. 92, 92– 110 (2012).
23. See, e.g., LUCY CORKIN, UNCOVERING AFRICAN AGENCY: ANGOLA’S MANAGEMENT OF
CHINA’S CREDIT LINES 18 (2013); William Brown and Sophie Harman, African Agency in
International Politics, in AFRICAN AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1, 2– 9 (William
Brown & Sophia Harman eds., 2013); Mohan & Lampert, supra note 22, at 92, 95– 97.
24. See generally Peter Kragelund, The Revival of Non-Traditional State Actors’ Interests
in Africa: Does it Matter for Policy Autonomy?, 30 DEV. POL’Y REV. 703 (2012) (describing
relationships between Africa and India, and Africa and China).
25. See ANTHONY LAKE ET AL., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MORE THAN HUMANITARIANISM: A STRATEGIC U.S. APPROACH TOWARD AFRICA 42– 45, 46– 49, Independent Task
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Our working hypothesis is that when commodity prices are high,
more power rests with African rentier states,26 and when prices fall, more
power rests with China and with other international actors. In order to
interrogate this hypothesis, however, it is first necessary to define more
concretely what constitutes agency in international relations and affairs. Is
it the case that some African states have seen a strengthening of domestic
sovereignty— achieving hegemony in the Gramscian sense domestically—
and are therefore better able to bargain with external actors and power?
While the recent reorientation in the literature focusing on the agency
of African political elites has been salutary and insightful, this Article
argues that the recent emphasis on African agency risks unwittingly reinforcing “internalist” explanations of African underdevelopment. In other
words, positing African elites as being in the “driving seat,” or as being “copilots” in relations with China may imply that the elites have the power to
reshape fundamentally the nature of their state-societies. This Article, in
contrast to some other accounts, argues that the power of African elites has
been confined to bargaining rather than structural change. In order to
understand this arrangement, we have to go beyond the rather static and
one-dimensional concept of agency often deployed in the literature, and
instead deploy assemblage thinking. Doing so forces us to emphasize the
provisional and spatial nature of social change and acknowledge that
power is co-existing, multi-dimensional, and in constant transition.
The next Part examines the concept of agency and argues that, as often
used, agency has certain limitations when it comes to understanding societal change in contemporary Africa. Part III then introduces assemblage
theory and proposes that we can use this more open and fluid conceptualization to enhance our understanding of how Chinese activities affect African power vis-à-vis the “West” as well as with China. Finally, Part IV
examines the evidence of power shifts in two critical cases, namely Zambia
and Angola. Part V concludes by posing the question: who is in charge?
II. Defining Agency
The relative importance of structure and agency have been long theorized and debated in the social sciences.27 Social constructivism has
largely transcended this debate by showing that agents create structures
Force Report No. 56 (2006), http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/more-than-humanitarianism/p9302.
26. Rentier states are states that meet the following conditions: they derive a substantial portion of their revenues from rents; the lion’s share of these rents come from
abroad; the rents accrue to the government directly; and only a few people are involved
in the generation of the rent. See Hazem Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in
THE ARAB STATE 85, 87– 88 (Giacomo Luciano ed., 1990). Typically in rentier states,
political elites benefit substantially and disproportionately from rent inflows, whereas
the majority of the population may be left in dire poverty.
27. See, e.g., ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 142– 43
(1999) (describing the debate in international relations “between constructivists and
rationalists about culture . . . [and] the question of how agents relate to the structures
(ideational or material) in which they are embedded”).
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through ideas.28 This raises the question, however, of which agents have
the power to create structures and reform them. If resource dependence is
a common structure for much of Africa, do political elites on the continent
have the power to change this?29
The evidence to date would seem to suggest that resource dependence
is a long-lived structure of African political economy. This dependence is
currently being reinforced through trade and investment relations with
China, as most of the continent continues to undergo relative deindustrialization30 as a result of competitive displacement from cheaper Asian
imports, particularly Chinese imports.31 The global trade structure of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) further circumscribes the ability of
developing countries to adopt strategic trade and industrial policies that
could help foster a competitive manufacturing sector that could, in turn,
transcend the cycle of resource dependence.32 Moreover, most resourcerich African economies increasingly rely on revenues and export earnings
from a select number of commodities.33 For example, according to an African delegate at the WTO, “we have learnt to ask why, we have learnt to ask
how, and we have learnt to say ‘No.’”34 On the other hand, developed
countries have refused to countenance substantial concessions which
28. Id. at 140.
29. Of course, whether those agents have incentives to change resource dependence
is a different matter. See, e.g., Ed Stoddard, Africa Is Still Way Too Dependent on
Resources, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/26/usafrica-investment-idUSBRE93P0HX20130426 (describing the “double-edged sword” of
African resource wealth and investment).
30. This means that the manufacturing sector may be growing in absolute terms but
shrinking as a proportion of the economy, while other sectors grow more quickly. For
example, The Economist reported in 2015 that African manufacturing is growing as
quickly as the rest of the economy, but this may in part be a reflection of the slowing of
extractives in the context of what appears to be the end of the global commodity supercycle. The Twilight of the Resource Curse?, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www
.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21638141-africas-growth-being-poweredthings-other-commodities-twilight.
31. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Economic Development in Africa
Report 2012: Structural Transformation and Sustainable Development in Africa, 37– 48,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2012 (2012) (describing the relative increase in
imports and decline in exports in Africa, compared to other regions of the world); PATRICK BOND, LOOTING AFRICA: THE ECONOMICS OF EXPLOITATION 58 (2006) (describing the
displacement of African exports by cheaper East Asian manufactured goods).
32. See generally Robert Hunter Wade, What Strategies Are Viable for Developing
Countries Today? The World Trade Organization and the Shrinking of ‘Development Space’,
10 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 621 (2003) (arguing that the WTO trade structure, combined
with other international trade arrangements, makes illegal many of the industrial policies that helped East Asian countries develop their industrial and technological sectors,
thereby reinforcing the economic dominance of the West). It should be noted, however,
that Nigeria has adopted multiple import bans. See Ademola Oyejide et al., Import Prohibition as a Trade Policy Instrument: The Nigerian Experience, in MANAGING CHALLENGES OF
WTO PARTICIPIATION: 45 CASE STUDIES (2005), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/casestudies_e/case32_e.htm.
33. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 31, at 40– 47; BOND,
supra note 31, at 58.
34. Donna Lee, African Agency in Global Trade Governance, in AFRICAN AGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 34, 39 (William Brown & Sophie Harman eds., 2013).
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might lead to a more equitable world trading system, and low income countries risk being further marginalized by mega-regional trade agreements
which largely exclude them.35
Despite numerous government initiatives aimed at structural transformation, the situation remains unchanged in most countries: African
resource-rich economies export unprocessed commodities instead of
processed goods with higher value addition, broader and deeper linkages
within the domestic economy, and more knowledge spillovers between
firms that are co-located.36 In a sense, then, we can see that African political elites have not demonstrated that they have the power to change their
economies’ structural basis or to incorporate their states into the global
political economy.37
Moreover, as intimated previously, others might question what incentive African political elites have to change their economies, given the often
substantial material gains that the current structures produce.38 In the
recent literature on African agency, there has been a focus on how elites
have been able to extract favorable spot prices for “their” oil in Angola
when that oil is sold to China,39 how the Ethiopian government has been
able to use China to finance investment in sectors not supported by the
West,40 and how the Rwandan political elite has been able to leverage its
Western partners due to the negotiating power it gets from having more
partners.41 How favorable deals are, however, depends on the relative balance of power between nations, which includes economic demand and
supply conditions, the strategic importance of the commodity in question,
and whether the commodity is substitutable.42 African political elites have
demonstrated that they have not, as of yet, been able to change the terms of
the extraverted and commodity-oriented trading relationship, either
35. See Amitendu Palit, Mega-RTAs and LDCs: Trade Is Not for the Poor, 58 GEOFORUM
23, 24 (2015).
36. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 31, at 40– 47; BOND,
supra note 31, at 58– 59.
37. See TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 101 (describing African elites at international
forums as “characters reduced to beggars angling for some Chinese largesse, rather than
development-conscious participants, and certainly not partners”).
38. See, e.g., Onyedimmakachukwu Obiukwu, Africa’s Richest Presidents: Why
Jonathan’s Position Is Not The Biggest News, VENTURES AFR. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://venturesafrica.com/africas-richest-presidents-why-jonathans-position-is-not-the-biggestnews/ (describing the wealth and largesse of the ten richest African presidents in 2014).
39. In the words of Vickers, for instance: “[r]ecent studies provide compelling evidence that Angolan political elites are very much in the driver’s seat of negotiating SinoAngolan relations.” Brendan Vickers, Africa and the Rising Powers: Bargaining for the
‘Marginalized Many’, 89 INT’L AFF. 673, 677 (2013). See CORKIN, supra note 23, at
13– 28.
40. See Dejere Feyissa, Aid Negotiation: The Uneasy “Partnership” Between EPRDF and
the Donors, 5 J. E. AFR. STUD. 788, 808– 09 (2012).
41. See Sven Grimm, Aid Dependency as a Limitation to National Development Policy?
The Case of Rwanda, in AFRICAN AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 81, 81– 96 (William
Brown & Sophie Harman eds., 2013).
42. See Paul Streeten, The Dynamics of the New Poor Power, in A WORLD DIVIDED: THE
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 77, 83– 85 (G.K. Helleiner
ed., 1976).
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through the multilateral system or through the bilateral deals that have
been struck with China, notwithstanding a few Chinese-sponsored special
economic zones on the continent.43 Therefore, the “power” or “agency” of
African political elites has been confined to incremental bargaining rather
than structural change, and is highly circumscribed and limited.44 Where
agency is conceived of as the ability to effect change, the ability of African
elites to change fundamentally the nature of their economies would be
appear to be extremely limited.
A second objection to over-egging the importance of African agency in
international relations relates to the nature of agency itself. In psychology,
some theorists have cast doubt on the mind/brain division that much of
international relations theory implicitly accepts.45 For those theorists, the
brain is simply another bodily organ which responds to physical and chemical stimuli and has learnt from past experience, and there is no separate
“mind.”46 This is not to dispute that some people have power over others,
but rather to question the extent to which free will or voluntarism can be
attributed to actions. In this context, it then becomes very important to
distinguish between agency and power. While some African political elites
may have recently gained power in relation to external actors, their power
should not be confused with their agency or lack thereof.
III. The Assemblage Line of Sino-African Relations
An alternative way to conceptualize political-economic changes and
intra-elite relations between Africa and China is as assemblages. Assemblage essentially means “putting together.”47 The word thus points to the
fact that something is in the process of becoming— of flux— as opposed to
something that already exists. Assemblages are comprised of both material
objects and people or other animals, and they resemble actor networks.48
43. See William Gumede, Power and Inequality in Africa, OPEN SOC. INITIATIVE FOR S.
AFR. (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.osisa.org/openspace/regional/power-and-inequalityafrica.
44. See id. (describing how African elites have failed to update infrastructure, trade,
and political structure, and the resulting inability of African nations to negotiate or alter
unequal power relations with former colonial powers).
45. See Viviane Green, Introduction to EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN PSYCHOANALYSIS,
ATTACHMENT THEORY AND NEUROSCIENCE: CREATING CONNECTIONS 1, 3– 4 (Viviane Green
ed., 2003).
46. See id. at 3– 4 (describing how an “individual’s psychic life— self and object representations, psychic structure, underlying fantasy content and the manner in which
meanings are ascribed— obviously emerges from organic foundations but cannot be
reduced to them” because “the brain is a substrate of mind”).
47. Assemblage, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
11781 (“A bringing or coming together; a meeting or gathering; the state of being gathered or collected.”).
48. See BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY 132 (1987) (introducing the concepts of “human actors” and
“non-human actors”); Richie Nimmo, Actor-Network and Methodology: Social Research in
a More-Than-Human World, 6 METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS ONLINE 108, 109 (2011)
(describing actor network theory as “suggest[ing] that social relations should not be
seen in isolation, but as always existing in relations with all kinds of extra-social net-
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They suggest emergence rather than resultant formation, give emphasis to
the provisional and spatial nature of social change, and point towards heterogeneous actors and objects co-existing in open systems without forming
a coherent whole.49 In this manner, assemblages suggest that power is coexisting and in constant transition (locally as well as globally), set in
motion by co-functioning actors behaving without intentionality as is conventionally understood.50 Power therefore not only exits in the nationstate, but also exists in numerous interstate structures, in non-state actors,
in structures, and in actors.51
This line of reasoning essentially means that we cannot talk of SinoAfrican relations in its totality. Rather, we have to disaggregate the relationship and analyze its constituent parts in order to understand the
underlying processes and mechanisms at play. Moreover, these processes
and mechanisms do not act autonomously, but instead work in tandem
with other processes and affect other structures and relationships. In other
words, the assemblages of the Sino-African relationship also influence
other assemblages and other places at other times. To quote Acuto and
Curtis, “Sequence and temporality become vital: assemblages are born into
a pre-existing configuration of other assemblages.”52
Viewed in this frame, “African agency” is not in opposition to “Chinese power,” since the two concepts are inter-constitutive. For example, the
power of China in international economics and relations arises in part
from the government’s ability to fuel the national economy through African
oil and mineral imports.53 Likewise, the recent increase in the power of
the African political and economic elite stems substantially from a combination of rising commodity prices— sparked to a large extent by Chinese
demand54— reduced debt burdens, improved credit ratings, and a diversification of development partners, largely related to the surge of Chinese
interest in African economies and the indirect demand effects China
works between humans and nonhumans, which need to be recognized and made
visible”).
49. See Ben Anderson & Colin McFarlane, Assemblage and Geography, 43 AREA 124,
125 (2011). Cf. Nimmo, supra note 48 (describing how actor network theory “posits
hybrids of ‘societies-natures,’ heterogeneous assemblages in which humans and
nonhumans are inextricably mixed up together”).
50. See Jane Bennett, The Agency of Assemblages, in VIBRANT MATTER: A POLITICAL
ECOLOGY OF THINGS 21, 28– 31 (Jane Bennett ed., 2010) (describing the role of intentionality in various conceptions of agency).
51. See Michele Acuto & Simon Curtis, Assemblage Thinking and International Relations, in REASSEMBLING INTERNATIONAL THEORY 3, 7– 9 (Michele Acuto & Simon Curtis
eds., 2014); John Allen, Powerful Assemblages?, 43 AREA 154, 155 (2011); Anderson &
McFarlane, supra note 49, at 125 (describing power as being a “plurality in transformation,” rather than being confined to a central governing body); Saskia Sassen, Neither
Global Nor National: Novel Assemblages of Territory, Authority and Rights, 1 ETHICS &
GLOBAL POL. 61, 63 (2008) (describing the power of non-state actors).
52. Acuto & Curtis, supra note 51, at 8.
53. See Clifford Krauss & Keith Bradsher, China’s Global Search for Energy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 2014, at B1.
54. MASUMA FAROOKI & RAPHAEL KAPLINSKY, THE IMPACT OF CHINA ON GLOBAL COMMODITY PRICES: THE GLOBAL RESHAPING OF THE RESOURCES SECTOR 47, 58– 59, 65– 69
(2012).
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exerts.55 Thus, approaching the relationships between Africa and China
using the assemblage theory requires us to go beyond traditional agency
approaches by probing where “agency” is to be found, how it is established,
and which actors shape its development.
Nevertheless, some might question the ontological status of assemblages in an increasingly globalized world.56 For example, Chinese political elites are not just connected to their African counterparts, but to their
counterparts all around the world.57 In a sense, then, global socio-nature
could be considered a meta-assemblage, and sub-assemblages are merely
heuristic devices to make theoretical analysis easier. Viewed in this frame,
it appears that nature is ultimately in charge as an actor, as its laws and
rhythms defy human temporality and attempts to alter or limit them.58
We, however, see assemblages more as an empirical approach that on the
one hand forces us to unpack or critically examine accepted realities, and
on the other hand drives us to scrutinize how agency works and how it
influences Sino-African relations. Thus, thinking in terms of assemblages
enables us to further our understanding of evolving forms of power in contemporary international relations.
IV. Power Shifts in Zambia and Angola
This Article began by attempting to locate power in Sino-African relations to see which actors held it and along which dimensions. We have
questioned some received wisdoms and the ontological status of the concept of agency. We now proceed to probe these issues more deeply
through an examination of Sino-Zambian and Sino-Angolan relations.
Zambia and Angola are particularly interesting because they are both major
exporters of critical natural resources to China. Zambia is, as of 2015, the
second largest producer of copper in Africa, and a major supplier to China,
although some of this is routed through Switzerland.59 Angola, as of late
2015, is the largest exporter of oil on the continent to China and has
recently rivaled Nigeria as the continent’s biggest overall oil producer.60
Zambia and Angola are thus critical cases for the study of power and Afri55. See Dennis Tull, China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequence, 44 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 459, 471– 73, 475– 76 (2006).
56. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES 1– 2 (2006) (criticizing writing on globalization that “has failed to recognize [institutional and subjective micro-transformations produced by denationalization]
and has privileged outcomes that are self-evidently global”).
57. See, e.g., Stephen Aldred & Irene Jay Liu, Princeling of Private Equity, REUTERS
(Apr. 10, 2014), http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com//14/03/CHINA-PRINCELING.pdf
(describing the international investments and connections that Chinese political elite
use to amass tremendous wealth).
58. See NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE CLIMATE 21
(2014) (emphasizing the immutability of the laws of nature in contrast to the mutability
of human economic structures).
59. See Andrew England, Reality Check in Africa as Boom Time Ends, FIN. TIMES (Oct.
5, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e81d0b70-5e2f-11e5-a28b-50226830d644
.html#axzz3xiutIzbA.
60. See id.
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can agency. If we do not see structural power changes as a consequence of
China’s rejuvenated political and economic interest in Africa in these two
countries that have long-term, close collaborations with China, that are of
real importance for China’s geostrategic visions, and where incumbent governments increasingly have turned towards China to finance their visions
of becoming middle income countries, the likelihood that we will see structural power changes in other African countries as a result of the global
power shifts are arguably slim.61
A.

Sino-Zambian Relations: “Agency at the Margins”?

Much has been written over the last decade on Sino-Zambian relations.62 Zambia has been a hotbed of contention over the role of China on
the continent, as exemplified by extensive anti-Chinese riots in the capital
city Lusaka and in the Copperbelt region in 2006, following an election
that Michael Sata lost.63 In that year, Mr. Sata, the Patriotic Front candidate, ran on an explicitly anti-Chinese platform, with a particular focus on
Chinese investors, whom he called “infesters,” not investors.64 Mr. Sata
tapped into discontent about the distribution of natural resource wealth
and the highly unfavorable conditions under which Zambia’s copper industry had been privatized to the benefit of foreigners.65 In Lusaka, there was
also substantial resentment against Chinese traders who were often felt to
be displacing locals from the market.66
Mr. Sata eventually ascended to the presidency in 2011, after a campaign which was still critical of the Chinese presence in the country but
was less explicitly racist.67 Upon coming to power, President Sata’s first
diplomatic guest in the State House was the Chinese ambassador.68 This
signaled both the economic importance of the Sino-Zambian relationship,
and that President Sata wished to have a cooperative rather than a conflictive relationship.69 More importantly, perhaps, he sent Zambia’s first President, Kenneth Kaunda, to China to thank the government for the financial
61. For a discussion of why case studies are a methodologically sound means of
understanding broader phenomena, see generally Bent Flyvbjerg, Five Misunderstandings
About Case-Study Research, 12 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 219 (2006).
62. See, e.g., Godfrey Hampwaye & Peter Kragelund, Trends in Sino-Zambian Relations, in CHINA’S DIPLOMACY IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 27, 27– 29 (Seifudein Adem
ed., 2013); Dominik Kopinski & Andrzej Polus, Sino-African Relations: ‘An All-Weather
Friendship’ Weathering the Storm, 29 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 181 (2011).
63. Hampwaye & Kragelund, supra note 62, at 28– 29.
64. Id. at 29.
65. ALASTAIR FRASER & JOHN LUNGU, FOR WHOM THE WINDFALLS? WINNERS & LOSERS
IN THE PRIVITISATION OF ZAMBIA’S COPPER MINES 48 (2007).
66. See Chris McGreal, Thanks China, Now Go Home: Buy-Up of Zambia Revives Old
Colonial Fears, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/
feb/05/china.chrismcgreal.
67. See Michael Sata: Zambia’s ‘King Cobra’ Finally Strikes, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23,
2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15034694.
68. See Andrew Bowman, Can Zambia Stand Up To China?, NEW INTERNATIONALIST
MAG. (Dec. 1, 2011), http://newint.org/sections/agenda/2011/12/01/chinese-investment-in-zambia/.
69. Hampwaye & Kragelund, supra note 62, at 36– 37.
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and other support that Zambia had received from China since independence, such as the Tanzania-Zambia (TAZARA) railway constructed in the
1970s.70 Thus, given the growing dependence of the Zambian economy on
China for exports and investment, President Sata’s position shifted immediately on assumption of the presidency, as he was structurally enrolled
and inducted into the elite actor network.71
As a result of President Sata’s ascendance to the political elite, the
export-oriented copper assemblage remained intact.72 For example, while
he did introduce some “populist” policies, such as increasing minimum
wages and requiring that all receipts from mining transited through the
Zambian banking system to ensure that all appropriate taxes were paid, the
confrontational stance that he adopted towards Chinese engagement in
Zambia quickly moderated.73 Indeed, according to one report released
shortly before Sata’s death, the Chinese government paid for Sata’s hospital stay in Israel in 2014.74
Following Michael Sata’s death in late 2014, Zambia held presidential
by-elections in January 2015.75 The Patriotic Front candidate, Edward
Lungu, won the election by a slim margin, and he has maintained the close
relationship between Zambia and China that emerged during President
Mwanawasa’s term from 2001 to 2008, was expanded during President
Banda’s leadership from 2008 to 2011, and continued through President
Sata’s rule from 2011 to 2014.76 The enrollment of the incumbent Patriotic Front government into the China-centered copper export assemblage
was possible in part because of the commodity’s bivalent character as both
a national resource and international commodity.77 In other words, the
nature of Zambia’s economic relations with China meant that there was
both a demand for, and supply of, cooperation with the late President, who
had previously been very critical of China.78 Thus, the structural nature of
the dependent relationship that Zambia forged with China is evident.
70. See Sata Thanks China, ZAMBIAN WATCHDOG (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www
.zambiawatchdog.com/sata-thanks-china/.
71. See Hampwaye & Kragelund, supra note 62, at 36– 37.
72. See id. at 36.
73. Nic Cheeseman, Robert Ford & Neo Simutanyi, Is There a “Populist” Threat in
Zambia?, in ZAMBIA: BUILDING PROSPERITY FROM RESOURCE WEALTH 339, 345 (Christopher
Adam et al. eds., 2014).
74. China Paying for Sata’s Current Hospitalization in Israel, ZAMBIAN WATCHDOG
(June 25, 2014), http://www.zambianwatchdog.com/china-paying-satas-current-hospitalisation-in-israel/.
75. See Alan Cowell, Zambia: President Is Sworn In, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2015, at A5.
76. See Ndangwa Noyoo, Corporate Social Responsibility Forays in Southern Africa:
Perspectives from South Africa and Zambia, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN ITS EMBRYONIC FORM 69, 76– 77 (Stephen
Vertigans et al. eds., 2016).
77. See Alistair Fraser, Introduction to ZAMBIA, MINING AND NEOLIBERALISM: BOOM AND
BUST ON THE GLOBALIZED COPPERBELT 1, 1– 2 (Alistair Fraser & Miles Larmer eds., 2010)
(describing copper as the tail that wags the dog in Zambia). Copper accounts for
approximately three quarters of Zambia’s exports and much of that copper goes to
China. See Norimitsu Onishi, Zambia’s Economy, Driven By Copper, Tumbles as Chinese
Demand Cools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2015, at A10.
78. See Hampwaye & Kragelund, supra note 62, at 27– 40.
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This is not to deny that the Patriotic Front government did not try to
exert power both vis-à-vis the West and vis-à-vis China.79 The most recent
examples include a decision to go against the traditional development partners’ long-term agenda of privatization, first by de-privatizing the formerly
state-owned telecommunication provider Zamtel.80 The official reason for
this decision was one of economics: a commission formed by late President
Sata himself reached the conclusion that Zamtel had been undervalued
and hence that the sale had been illegal.81 The political undertone cannot
be missed. Michael Sata used his muscles to fight the West and to pursue a
domestic political goal of bringing ownership back into Zambian hands.
In a similar vein, the Zambian government in 2012 decided to cancel the
Zambian Railways privatization agreement.82 These material and symbolic
confrontations83 represent a re-inscription of African nationalism that in
some ways mirrors the ideology of Robert Mugabe (a close friend of President Sata).84
Moreover, the Patriotic Front-led government chose to flex its muscles
vis-à-vis private investors.85 This was done through a number of laws
passed in Parliament.86 The most important ones included a banning of
dollar-denominated transactions to minimize large-scale tax avoidance, and
the passing of the Bank of Zambia (Amendment) Act of 2013 that enabled
the Bank of Zambia to monitor and regulate better foreign exchange flows,
imports and exports, international transactions, equity investments, and
international money transfers in and out of the country.87
The Patriotic Front-led government also seemed eager to crack down
on companies that did not abide by Zambian laws. In this regard, it did
not spare Chinese companies, as evidenced by its takeover of the Chinese
and Australian-owned Collum Mine because of “gross abrogation of mining
and environmental laws,”88 the failure to pay mineral royalties,89 and the
shooting of thirteen miners, although the state ultimately decided not to
79. See Peter Kragelund, ‘Donors Go Home’: Non-Traditional State Actors and the Creation of Development Space in Zambia, 35 THIRD WORLD Q. 148, 157– 58 (2014).
80. See id. at 157.
81. See id.; Chris Mfula, Zambia Finds Zamtel’s Sale to Libyan Firm Illegal— Sata,
REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2011), http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5E7MH
2DW20111117.
82. See Kragelund, supra note 79, at 157.
83. DONAL B. CRUISE O’BRIEN, SYMBOLIC CONFRONTATIONS: MUSLIMS IMAGINING THE
STATE IN AFRICA 4 (2003) (describing the “politics of symbolic confrontation” as “a latent
electoral force in times of what may be democratic transition”).
84. Nse Udoh, Opinion, German Newspaper Describes Sata’s Zambia as ‘Birth of a
Dictatorship’, ZAM. REP. (June 26, 2012), http://zambiareports.com/2012/06/26/german-newspaper-exposes-satas-nepotism-and-dubious-anti-corruption-effort/.
85. See Kragelund, supra note 79, at 157.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Michael Chawe, Zambia Seizes Controversial Chinese-Owned Mine, AFR. REV. (Feb.
21, 2013), http://www.africareview.com/News/Zambia-seizes-controversial-Chineseowned-mine/-/979180/1700242/-/joitl4z/-/index.html.
89. See Barry Sautman & Yan Hairong, Bashing ‘the Chinese’: Contextualizing
Zambia’s Collum Coal Mine Shooting, 23 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 1073, 1078 (2014).
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prosecture the managers responsible.90 The circumstances surrounding
the shootings are highly contested, however, and some observers have
argued that the fractious labor relations at the mine were an outcome of
neoliberalism in Zambia rather than particularly poor working conditions
at the “Chinese” mine.91
Another tentative sign of increasing Zambian agency vis-à-vis external
actors came with the release of the 2015 budget, which announced an overhaul of the mining fiscal regime and thereby caused a certain amount of
tumult in the mining sector.92 As a result of the changes, Canadian-owned
Barrick Gold announced that it would close down the big Lumwana
mine.93 At first glance, this behavior looks like the Zambian state exerting
power over or against the corner-stone of the Zambian economy, namely
large-scale foreign mining companies.94 Statements from the Minister of
Finance, Alexander Chikwanda, reinforce the impression that Zambia in
fact resisted the “stampede” by the very mining companies that used the
threat of closing down operations to force him to nullify the changes that
he proposed to the mining fiscal regime: “[the mining tax change] will pass
through in its current form . . . . These people don’t allow us to think
about our own ideas, they just want to think for us . . . some mining companies want to stampede us to change the tax regime.”95
On closer inspection, however, the proposed overhaul of the mining
fiscal regime was not necessarily a sign of increasing Zambian agency.
First, analysts see this more as a sign of weakness than strength on the part
of the Zambian state because, as The Economist noted in December 2014,
“[t]he raising of taxes suggests the government has bowed to internal pressure to increase the mining sector’s contribution to revenue collection.”96
More importantly, the change of the mining fiscal regime was essentially a
change of tax levels, including royalties and income tax, rather than an
alteration of how taxes are calculated.97 As Robert Conrad has explained
in detail, the Zambian mining fiscal regime is characterized by vagueness,
90. See id. at 1073, 1082.
91. See id. at 1090– 92.
92. See Tax Increases Spark Mine Closures, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Dec. 22,
2014), http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=282604012&Country=Zambia&
topic=Economy&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Economic+growth&u=1&pid=1433
082327&oid=1433082327&uid=1. Changes included an increase of the royalty— the
payment proportional to the purchase price of the ore to the owner of the reserve— from
six to eight percent for underground mines and from six to twenty percent for open pit
mines. See id.
93. See id.
94. See Kragelund, supra note 79, at 157.
95. Chola Mukanga, Mining Companies Stampede on Zambia, ZAMBIAN ECONOMIST
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.zambian-economist.com/2014/12/mining-companies-stampede-on-zambia.html.
96. Mining Taxes Increased to Finance 2015 Budget, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
(Oct. 14, 2014), http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=602380244&Country=
Zambia&topic=Economy&subtopic=For_1.
97. Id.
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where vagueness benefits the mining companies— not the Zambian state.98
This is especially apparent with regards to the base for royalty calculations
and how to measure quantities of output. With regard to the former, some
mining companies determine the base for royalty calculations on the price
that they get paid by buyers overseas, while others establish the base with
respect to concentrate or on the smelter output production.99 How to measure quantities of output is not clear either: some use production figures,
others use concentrate figures (either when sold to domestic smelters or
when exported), and finally, some use the number of copper cathodes
(sheets) produced.100 The result is that while mining companies in
Zambia pay significantly more tax now than they did immediately after the
mines were privatized in the late 1990s, “the number of mines actually
paying tax is known to be relatively few.”101
In fact, in a February 2015 ministerial statement to the assembly, Minister of Finance Alexander Chikwanda said that the main reason for introducing a new mining tax regime was that:
[T]he tax structure was simply illusory as only two mining companies were
paying Company Income Tax under the previous tax regime as most of them
claimed that they were not in tax-paying positions. . . [i]t has therefore
became [sic] imperative for the Government to restructure the mining tax
regime by replacing the profit based tax system with a simple mineral royalty
based regime that is final so that we insulate ourselves against tax planning
schemes which are structured to wipe out taxable profits.102

Furthermore, the power of the Zambian government vis-à-vis the largescale mining companies soon turned out to be an illusion. The proposed
amendments to the mining tax regime were retracted because of uproar
among the mining companies who threatened to cut jobs, delay investments, and close down operations if they were implemented.103 The Zambian government therefore backtracked key aspects of the mining tax
regime and proposed to introduce a flat nine percent royalty tax for open
pit and underground mines, combined with an increase in corporate taxes
in April 2015.104 The official argument was that mining companies have
to pay royalty taxes, which are derived from the value of production, from
the day operations begin— but before operations become profitable due to
98. See Robert Conrad, Mineral Taxation in Zambia, in ZAMBIA: BUILDING PROSPERITY
RESOURCE WEALTH 82, 97 (Christoper Adam et al. eds., 2014).
99. See id. at 84, 97.
100. See id. at 98.
101. See id. at 93.
102. Only Two Mining Companies Were Paying Tax Under the Previous Tax Regime—
Chikwanda, LUSAKA TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.lusakatimes.com/2015/02/26/
two-mining-companies-paying-tax-previous-tax-regime-chikwanda/.
103. See Cecilia Jamasmie, It’s Official: Zambia Scales Back Mining Royalties to 9%,
MINING.COM (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.mining.com/its-official-zambia-scales-backmining-royalties-to-9/; George Mwenya, Cabinet Slashes Mining Royalties to 9%, ZAM. REP.
(Apr. 20, 2015), http://zambiareports.com/2015/04/20/cabinet-slashes-mining-royalties-to-9/.
104. IMF, Zambia: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 15/153 ¶¶ E.16– E.18 (May 5,
2015).
FROM
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the large-scale sunk costs— whereas corporate taxes only apply once the
operations become profitable.105 Hence, the financial burden on the mining corporations was too high.106
Additionally, the proposal was considered unfair by some mining
companies. The main issue was that it did not distinguish between the old
underground mines characterized by higher operation costs and higher
input costs for production, and the new open pit mines with lower
costs.107 Moreover, it raised the royalty tax for underground mines from
eight to nine percent.108 Furthermore, on June 5, 2015, presidential
spokesperson Amos Chanda announced yet another reversal: the new proposal is to keep a nine percent royalty tax for open pit mines and lower the
royalty tax for underground mines to six percent.109
What we have witnessed, then, is a large-scale mining taxation regime
reversal that will end up with a tiny increase from six to nine percent for
open pit mines and no increase for underground mines. Simultaneously,
the government of Zambia has returned to a complex tax system that is
hard to enforce. Some mining companies operate both open pit and underground mines, and the two-tier system that may end up benefitting only
large-scale mining companies has been reintroduced.110
The alteration of the mining fiscal regime therefore does not signal
African agency in the way implied by the use of the term in some of the
recent literature. Rather, the lack of real changes in the mining fiscal
regime, which allows for a continuation of a lack of clear definitions and
rules, may give the Zambian political elite power vis-à-vis the electorate or
may be primarily for the benefit of the political elite. This is in contrast to
Chinese actors deriving the benefit, since public information about how
much tax is paid by whom and why is at best scarce and is often also
opaque. The alteration of the mining fiscal regime, thus, appears to have
been partly an attempt to assuage the public, a substantial portion of
whom were enraged by working practices at Chinese or Chinese-associated
firms.111 In a sense, then, it represents a hegemonic strategy to achieve
consent on the part of the governed. It also appears to have been relatively
successful, as the Patriotic Front’s candidate was elected in the recent presidential by-election.112
Instead of agency, the alterations to the mining fiscal regime therefore
point towards numerous power transitions at local, national, and global
105. See id.; WBG, Zambia Economic Brief: Making Mining Work for Zambia 20– 21
(2015), http://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22039.
106. See IMF, supra note 104, ¶¶ B4– B7.
107. See Matthew Hill, Zambia to Cut Proposed Underground Mine Royalties to 6%,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jun. 4, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-04/
zambia-agrees-to-cut-proposed-underground-mine-royalties-to-6-.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See WBG, supra note 105, at 23.
111. See Sautman & Hairong, supra note 89, at 1089 (describing Zambian discontent
with working conditions at Chinese-operated mines).
112. Cowell, supra note 75.
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levels, none of which alter the structural underpinnings of Zambia’s international relations. As laid out above, assemblages are essentially actor-networks where both human and non-human actors exert power.113 Thinking
about the Zambian political system in this way allows us to go beyond an
analysis of how Zambian state actors seek to exert power; we are also able
to analyze how the very structures of a resource-rich economy limit their
ability to change fundamentally these power and economic structures.
China and other foreign actors in Zambia do not only derive their
power from their ability to grant or deny new loans or investments of
importance for the Zambian government in its quest for modernization
and economic development. To the contrary, China derives its power from
the structurally embedded nature of dependence that originates in sunk
investments in copper mines, conveyor belts and other infrastructure
projects, jobs linked to those projects, and dependence on copper for foreign exchange earnings and some taxes. The mining sector is characterized by extreme capital- and technology-intensity, not only of the mines
themselves, but also of many of the activities in the value chain that begin
with the exploration phase and continue with mine construction, ores
extraction, smelting, leaching, and refining, all the way to fabrication of
final goods and eventually scraps.114 The first parts of this chain require
especially heavy engineering skills and substantial capital.115
Given the capital-intensive nature of the mining sector, the costs of
exercising agency through the partial nationalization of Chinese or other
mines would then have been substantial.116 Instead, what we have witnessed is power or “agency at the margins” in terms of the raising of minimum wages and threats to renationalize less capital-intensive firms.
Londsdale refers to this situation as “agency in tight corners.”117 The central agency employed, however, involved reproducing the extant structure
of the actor-network, despite the formal right to assert full sovereignty over
“national” resources such as copper. Thus, Zambia arguably reproduced
the hegemony of transnational capital through a slight renegotiation of the
contract of extraversion to facilitate legitimation. The contract of extraversion is the implicit bargain between African state elites and foreign investors where natural resources are exported in exchange for a share of
113. See LATOUR, supra note 48, at 132; Nimmo, supra note 48.
114. See WBG, supra note 105, at 17, 20– 21; UNEP Fin. Initiative, Environmental and
Social Risk Briefing 1– 3 (2006), http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/toolkit/Mining_Metals_ESRBN_amended180806.pdf.
115. C.W. Berry & D.E. Fletcher, Management Philosophies, in SURFACE MINING 1023,
1025 (Bruce A. Kennedy ed., 1990) (“in mining, most investment capital is in the development-construction phase”).
116. Cf. William A. Stoever, A Business Analysis of the Partial Nationalization of
Zambia’s Copper Industry, 1969– 1981, 16 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 137, 137 (1985) (describing
the substantial financial cost to Zambia of partial nationalization of its mines between
1969 and 1981).
117. John Lonsdale, Agency in Tight Corners: Narrative and Initiative in African History, 13 J. AFR. CULTURAL STUD. 5, 5– 16 (2000).
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resource rents.118
Even this type of agency, however, is precarious, because the windfall
taxes imposed on copper miners when prices were high were quickly
reversed when prices fell following the global financial crisis and subsequent falling demand in China.119 Thus, the most recent example of Zambian agency vis-à-vis the mining companies in reality did not change the
power structures between the complex transnational mining corporations
and the understaffed Zambian tax authorities.120
In a similar vein, the banning of dollar-denominated transactions has
since been revoked due to widespread criticism from foreign investors in
Zambia; again, this signals a limit to the power of the Zambian political
elite.121 Thus, the agency of the Zambian state in relation to the international market— and most significantly, China— has been very limited in
both extent and temporality. As laid out above, the new Lungu-led government has not changed the situation significantly; the contours of economic
and resource dependence remain unchanged.
B.

Sino-Angolan Relations: An Example of “Hemmed In” Agency?

Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos has been in power since 1979,
making him Africa’s second-longest serving head of state.122 He remained
in power during that country’s long civil war, and has remained in power
for more than a decade since the end of that conflict.123
Nevertheless, Lucy Corkin’s recent book attributes substantial agency
to the Angolan government in negotiating its relationship with China.124
118. See Peter Kragelund, Cruciform Sovereignty, Matrix Governance and the Scramble
for Africa’s Oil: Interpretations from Chad and Sudan, 28 POL. GEOGRAPHY 353 (2009).
119. See Duncan Green, A Copper-Bottomed Crisis? Economic Meltdown on Zambia,
OXFAM INT’L 5 (Dec. 22, 2009), http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/a-copper-bottomed-crisis-the-impact-of-the-global-economic-meltdown-on-zambia-111973;
Chola Mukanga, Lungu’s Copper Challenge, ZAMBIAN ECONOMIST (Feb. 12, 2015), http://
www.zambian-economist.com/2015/02/lungus-copper-challenge.html (describing the
Zambian government’s response to the global recession in terms of tax changes in the
mining sector).
120. See Kofi Annan, Tackle Tax Evasion to Fuel Africa’s Development, THE ELDERS (July
19, 2013), http://theelders.org/article/tackle-tax-evasion-fuel-africas-development
(describing tax authorities across Africa as “understaffed and poorly resourced”); OddHelge Fjeldstad & Kari K. Heggstad, The Tax Systems in Mozambique, Tanzania and
Zambia: Capacity and Constraints, CHR. MICHELSEN INST. 56 (Jun. 15, 2011), http://www
.cmi.no/publications/file/4045-taxation-mozambique-tanzania-zambia.pdf (describing
Zambia’s mining ministry as “understaffed” and “one of the least prioritized ministries
in terms of funding from the government budget”).
121. See Celia Becker, Zambia Scraps Exchange Control Regulations, ENS AFR. (May 23,
2014), https://www.ensafrica.com/news/Zambia-scraps-exchange-control-regulations?
Id=1438&STitle=tax%20ENSight.
122. Patrick McGroarty, Angola’s Boom, Fueled by China, Goes Bust, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/angolas-boom-fueled-by-china-goes-bust1446072930.
123. Michael Specter, Extreme City: The Severe Inequality of the Angolan Oil Boom, THE
NEW YORKER (June 1, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/01/
extreme-city-specter.
124. See generally CORKIN, supra note 23.
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In some recent years, Angola has been China’s single biggest supplier of oil,
and Corkin argues that this has given the country’s government substantial
leverage in its negotiations with China.125 This is undoubtedly true, but as
with the Zambian case, the overall structure of dependence on resource
exports has remained in place.126 Arguably, the principal focus of the
regime has been on its own maintenance, which has been spectacularly
achieved— the ruling party won more than seventy percent of the votes in
the 2012 election127— rather than structural transformation. The Angolan
elite have been able to leverage their external connections (both economic
and political) to maintain the power status quo, and they have deployed
state power to structure the country’s extraversion portfolio to ensure that
result.128 According to Marcus Power:
State power in Angola does not reside primarily in the government or in the
ruling party the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) per se,
but, more accurately, in a clique of technocrats and advisors centered on the
President . . . . This group, named the Futungo after the Presidential palace,
is a nebulous group of unelected officials and businessmen around President Eduardo dos Santos which became the key structure of power in the
1980s, in tandem with the sidelining [sic] of MPLA party organs and formal
state structures. Sonangol [the state oil company] essentially exists to harness and further their agenda . . . and as such it constitutes a structure of
power alongside the formal state institutions, a kind of “parallel state” . . . .
Thus far the Chinese credit lines have remained firmly in the grips of the
Futungo and there has been evidence of their misappropriation.129

This is in contrast to Corkin, who argues that “Angolan political elites, in a
post-civil war environment, are attempting to use Chinese financial assistance as a state building device.”130
The discrepancy between these two perspectives may be explained by
differences in the definition of what constitutes a state: whereas Power
refers to what is sometimes called the “shadow state,”131 it appears that
Corkin conflates the shadow state with the formal state.132 At the heart of
this difference lies the locus of power. According to Corkin, there is a difference between “despotic and infrastructural power, the former referring
to ‘the range of actions that the elite is empowered to undertake without
routine’ and the latter the ability to execute them.”133 This dualist concep125. Id. at 17, 59.
126. WORLD BANK, ANGOLA ECONOMIC UPDATE: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES
SHAPING ANGOLA’S FUTURE 9 (2013), http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/
Worldbank/document/Africa/Angola/angola-economic-update-june-2013.pdf.
127. Pascal Fletcher & Shrikesh Laxmidas, Angola’s Dos Santos Secures Big Election
Win, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-angola-electionidUSBRE88005020120901.
128. See Caryn Peiffer & Pierre Englebert, Extraversion, Vulnerability to Donors, and
Political Liberalization in Africa, 111 AFR. AFF. 355, 361 (2012).
129. Marcus Power, Angola 2025: The Future of the “World’s Richest Poor Country” as
Seen Through a Chinese Rear-View Mirror, 44 ANTIPODE 993, 998 (2012).
130. CORKIN, supra note 23, at 25.
131. See, e.g., WILLIAM RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES 2 (1995).
132. CORKIN, supra note 23, at 25.
133. Id. at 25 n.18.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-1\CIN101.txt

20

unknown

Seq: 20

11-MAY-16

Cornell International Law Journal

14:31

Vol. 49

tion of power, however, is at odds with assemblage thinking, in which
power resides not in actors but in networks: power rests in the ability to
execute it, and without that ability, power does not exist. What is the
nature of the power of the Angolan state and the powerful clique around
the president known as the “Futungo”?
According to Marques de Morais, after the end of the civil war in
Angola in 2002, “the government took a fateful step, calling on China to
fulfill the promise of reconstruction— in the same way it had outsourced its
national defense needs to Cuba from 1975 to 1989.”134 By way of example, the construction of the Kilamba Kiaxi housing complex in Luanda
employed more than ten thousand Chinese workers, and security for this
multi-billion dollar development was provided by the Presidential
Guard.135 What this example demonstrates is both the power of the Angolan state to provide security, and its weakness in terms of the provision of
public and social services. The development, then, resulted from the
power of the assemblage of Angolan state and Chinese actors to develop
building sites, import materials and labor, and provide security. The development, however, has also encountered resistance, as “[t]he large Chinese
presence has resulted in growing resentment from Angolans and increasing
personal attacks,”136 given the nature of the Angolan model, wherein seventy percent of the contracts for construction and infrastructure from oilbacked loans from China were required to go to Chinese companies.137
Shinn and Eisenman also detail how the Angolan political elite wish to
maintain relations with a variety of external partners to prevent China
from developing a “monopoly of influence.”138 When oil prices fell following the global financial crisis, for example, President dos Santos made two
trips to Beijing to ensure continued access to Chinese funding,139 demonstrating both the constrained temporality and spatiality of Angolan agency
in bargaining relations with external actors, and particularly China. With
oil prices continuing to plummet into 2016,140 the agency of the Angolan
134. Rafael Marques de Morais, The New Imperialism: China in Angola, WORLD AFF. J.
(Mar./Apr. 2011), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-imperialism-chinaangola.
135. See id.
136. DAVID H. SHINN & JOSHUA EISENMAN, CHINA AND AFRICA: A CENTURY OF ENGAGEMENT 342 (2012).
137. See Jamil Anderlini, China Insists on ‘Tied Aid’ in Angola, FIN. TIMES (June 25,
2007), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/908c24f2-2343-11dc-9e7e-000b5df10621
.html#axzz2RtN8dPxR.
138. SHINN & EISENMAN, supra note 136, at 343.
139. Id.
140. See Stanley Reed, Oil Price Falls as Global Growth Anxiety Weighs on Markets,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/business/energyenvironment/oil-prices.html. The rapid decline in oil prices has been driven by
increased domestic production in the United States, a lagging demand for fuel in much
of Europe, and a continued unwillingness of OPEC to intervene and stabilize oversaturated markets. See Clifford Krauss, Oil Prices: What’s Behind the Drop? Simple Economics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/
business/energy-environment/oil-prices.html.
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political actors is likely to be even more constrained.141 In this sense, they
are hemmed in by combined resource and external dependence.142
V.

Conclusion: Who is in Charge?

“African countries ought to be able to adopt a . . . strategy of integrating trade, financing and development considerations in their approach to
the BRICS . . . [but] Africa does not appear to have established the necessary capacity to negotiate such outcomes.”143 This statement highlights
multiple issues of power at play. First, African elites have the capacity to
negotiate deals with China and the other BRICS countries that would promote industrialization. Second, African political elites have incentives to
do so, given the benefits that flow to them from current arrangements.
Third, China and the other BRICS members have incentives to promote
industrialization in partner and competitor countries. Fourth, African
elites have the ability to negotiate favorable arrangements with China and
other BRICS members, despite the constraints imposed by the WTO, which
has severely circumscribed the ease of deploying strategic trade and industrial policy instruments.144
China largely promotes external neoliberalization (meaning free trade
and investment145) to ensure its own strategic interests through the “new
constitutionalism” of the WTO.146 African political elites, on the other
hand, are often happy to deploy the “strategy of extraversion.”147 This
coincidence of interests has resulted in a Sino-African assemblage that is
itself embedded in a broader structure of empire.148 For example, from
2005 to 2006, fifteen percent of World Bank projects in Africa were under141. Cf. Krauss, supra note 140 (describing oil-producing countries and states as
losers in the global oil price decline and as “suffering economic and perhaps even political turbulence”).
142. See Thomas M. Callaghy & John Ravenhill, Introduction— Vision, Politics, and
Structure: Afro-Optimism, Afro-Pessimism or Realism? to HEMMED IN: RESPONSES TO
AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DECLINE 1, 2 (Thomas M. Callaghy & John Ravenhill eds., 1993).
143. IAN TAYLOR, AFRICA RISING? BRICS— DIVERSIFYING DEPENDENCY 160 (2014) (quoting U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR AFR., AFRICA-BRICS COOPERATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR
GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION IN AFRICA 32 (2013)).
144. See generally Wade, supra note 32 (arguing that WTO trade structure, combined
with other international trade arrangements, makes illegal many of the industrial policies that helped East Asian countries develop their industrial and technological sectors,
thereby reinforcing the economic dominance of the West). But see Oyejide et al., supra
note 32 (describing how Nigeria has adopted multiple import bans, despite the WTO’s
trade structure).
145. See Pádraig R. Carmody, Building BRICS in Africa?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
BRICS AND EMERGING ECONOMIES (P.B. Anand et al. eds., forthcoming).
146. See STEPHEN GILL, POWER AND RESISTANCE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 131 (2003).
147. Jean-François Bayart, Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion, 99 AFR. AFF.
217, 227 (2000) (describing the strategy as limited by its inability to “incorporate either
economically or institutionally, in terms of either education or ideology, [disenfranchised groups], namely young people and rural communities, in spite of the fact that
these two excluded categories actually compose the majority of the population”).
148. See Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Preface to MICHAEL HARDT AND ANTONIO
NEGRI, EMPIRE, at xxi (2000).
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taken by Chinese firms.149
A focus on “African agency” is simultaneously both salutary and
obscurantist. Writers in this school are correct to argue that African political elites are powerful. Their primary power, however, is in their “vertical”
relations with their domestic citizens, and their ability to arbitrage or leverage external relations to achieve this.150 In some cases, such as Zambia,
this has resulted in the achievement of Gramscian hegemony; in others,
such as Angola, it has resulted in the maintenance and deepening of coercive authoritarian rule. Depending on demand and price conditions, African states have been able to exercize agency at the margins in order to
capture a greater share of national resource rents for themselves or their
treasuries. As of now, however, they have been unable to alter fundamentally the nature of the dependency that characterizes their relations with
China and other foreign powers and companies. With respect to China in
particular, the successful internationalization of the state has made such
fundamental changes impossible, given the nature of that internationalization. For example, Gonzalez-Vicente argues specifically that the internationalization of the Chinese state is comprised of three parallel processes:
(i) the re-territorialization of the state through transnational sovereignty
arrangements, or what the state governs; (ii) the negotiation and struggle for
spaces of statehood within the increasingly capitalist Chinese state (domestically and abroad), or who governs; (iii) and the transformations of power,
culture and governmentality within the internationalized state and the
attendant micro-politics of everyday affairs and politics of state transnationality, or how the state governs.151

Thus, by incorporating African states, and specifically African political
elites, into each step of the process of internationalization, China has reinforced politically and economically dependent relationships with those
states.
The last decade has been a momentous time in African political economy. Many regimes were able to leverage the commodity boom into sustaining regime maintenance.152 Widespread debt relief from the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund on the continent has reduced the
leverage of Western powers, even as the power of China on the continent
has grown, partly because it was “knocking on a wide open door.” As
149. See Jean-Raphaël Chaponnièr, L’aide Chinoise à L’Afrique: Origines, Modalités et
Enjeux, 38 L’ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE 7 (2008), http://www.cairn.info/revue-l-economiepolitique-2008-2-page-7.htm.
150. Cf. CORKIN, supra note 23, at 18 (describing how African political elites may
profess to act in the national interest, but because “it is often they who define the
national interest, [they act] almost certainly to their own advantage and often to the
detriment of other domestic actors not within their sphere of influence”); Vickers, supra
note 39, at 677– 78 (explaining that some African political elite have carved out considerable policy space by leveraging their negotiation power with China, despite the fact
that the negotiations do not necessarily translate into developmental benefits).
151. Ruben Gonzalez-Vincente, The Internationalization of the Chinese State, 30 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 402, 403 (2011).
152. See Tull, supra note 55, at 463– 71 (describing the relationships between African
elites in resource-rich states and Chinese development goals).
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structural adjustment programs opened African economies, African political elites preferred China’s non-conditional foreign policy, while Western
powers had neglected the continent, which largely fell outside of their geopolitical gaze, in favor of the dynamic economies of the East.153 This situation, however, has now changed.
As to the question of who is in charge, this depends on the issue area
under consideration. Many African states have become more effective at
projecting power across distance and strengthening domestic sovereignty.154 They have also been able to exercise positive agency at the margins through, for example, renegotiation of resource contracts on more
favorable terms.155 The overall contract of extraversion, however, remains
firmly in place.156 This contract takes the form of an actor network that is
largely stable in terms of its constitution and configuration, even if the
personalities involved change, as in the Zambian case.157 This speaks to
an older insight from structuration theory, which is that while it is true
that agents create structures, they are recursively shaped by structures as
well.158 Thus, while structures do not create agents, they strongly shape
them and their latitude of action.
A potential flaw in the recent overemphasis on African agency is that it
might unwittingly reinforce internalist explanations of African
underdevelopment. Positing African elites as largely being in the driving
seat in relations with China risks implying that they have the power to
reshape fundamentally the nature of their state-societies. This is patently
untrue. In this Article we have raised reservations about how agency is
conceptualized in African studies and cautioned that it needs to be, if not
discarded, at least situated in the context of massive power differentials
between states in the international system and the continuing and arguably
deepening power of transnational capital, all of which are constituted
through actor-networks. While it is certainly accurate and salutary to highlight the power of African state elites and other actors on the continent,
there is a need to temper this through recognition of the ongoing realities
and structural conditions of the functioning of the global political
economy.

153. See generally Peter Kragelund, Knocking on a Wide-Open Door: Chinese Investments in Africa, 36 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 479 (2009) (arguing that China has been the
recipient of a favorable development climate in Africa in part because of Western policies that helped create that environment); Peter Kragelund, The Revival of Non-Traditional
State Actors’ Interests in Africa: Does it Matter for Policy Autonomy?, 30 DEV. POL. REV.
703 (2012) [hereinafter Kragelund 2012].
154. See Kragelund 2012, supra note 153, at 709– 10.
155. See Vickers, supra note 39, at 677– 78 (describing the limited power of African
states vis-à-vis negotiation of resource contracts).
156. See generally PÁDRAIG R. CARMODY, GLOBALIZATION IN AFRICA: RECOLINIZATION OR
RENAISSANCE? (2010) (describing China’s role in African development).
157. See supra Part IV.A.
158. See Keith Morrison, Structuration Theory, Habitus and Complexity Theory: Elective Affinities or Old Win in New Bottles?, 26 BRITISH J. SOC. EDU. 311, 313– 14 (2005).
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